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ABSTRACT
We study the importance of technology and institutions in determining the size of markets in five different
countries and fifteen different German states. The setting of 19th century Europe presents a unique
opportunity to address this issue, since it witnessed fundamental change in both dimensions. At the
beginning of the century, numerous customs borders, separate currencies with different monetary systems,
and poor transportation facilities were major obstacles that held back trade. Important institutional
change, through the Zollverein customs treaties and currency unification, and major technological
innovations in the steam train all had a role in increasing market size as measured in terms of the spatial
dispersion of grain prices across 68 markets. However, we find that the impact of steam trains is substantially
larger than the effects from customs liberalizations and currency agreements in increasing market size,
where correcting for the potential endogeneity in institutional and technological changes are crucial
for this result. We also find that a state's institutions influence the rate of adoption of steam trains,
thereby identifying an important indirect effect from institutions on economic performance. The institutional
and technological changes account for almost all of the decline in price gaps over this period.
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The growth of Europe, and indeed of the world, has been linked to the scope of market trans-
actions. In fact, it has been said that economic development is the spread of markets.1 As
the market size increases, trade raises economic welfare due to the e¢ ciency gains of greater
specialization, the division of labor, and potential additional gains through scale economies.
Moreover, the welfare gains from increases in market size can be compounded manifold if they
usher in an era of higher sustained per-capita growth for an economy.
Institutions that reduce transactions costs are one obvious factor that determines the size
of the market, yet little is known about the importance of institutions relative to other means
by which market expansion occurs.2 This paper analyzes these issues by examining the spatial
dispersion of grain prices in 68 European markets. These markets are located in ￿ve di⁄erent
countries and ￿fteen di⁄erent German states, including Prussia. The area corresponds approx-
imately to the location of today￿ s Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland (See Figure 1). The goal of this paper is to assess
the contributions of the key institutional and technological innovations to trade in 19th century
Europe, when the scope of markets was increasing at a speed faster than at any point in the
past.
The ￿rst question we ask, and answer, is how much of an impact did institutional agreements
have on market size compared to that of a key transport technology of the 19th century,
the steam train. Transactions costs to trade were high in the late 18th century. The steam
train dramatically altered the transportation system in which overland transport was often
1Braudel (1992, 225).
2We borrow North￿ s (1990, 3) notion of institutions; they are "the rules of the game in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction".
1achieved by horsedrawn carriages. There were about 1,800 customs borders in Germany alone
at this time.3 Moreover, a vast number of di⁄erent currencies existed, which had the e⁄ect of
reducing market size even further. Fundamental change arrived in the 19th century. The main
mechanism bringing down customs borders was an institution called the Zollverein, the "classic
example of a customs union".4 Starting in the year 1828, the Zollverein treaties successively
liberalized trade among some thirty-￿ve member states that would later become Germany. The
￿rst half of the 19th century witnessed also the creation of the ￿rst major monetary agreements
in Europe. The institutional framework provided by these laws governing commodity and
foreign exchange transactions was a clear break from centuries of relatively chaotic conditions,
and so one would expect their impact to be large. We show, however, that accounting for
the endogeneity of these changes is critical for obtaining proper estimates of the impact of
institutions on the size of the market.
Secondly, we consider whether the timing of the adoption of technology could be an indirect
outcome of the di⁄erent institutions that prevailed in 19th century Europe. Over the last several
years the literature has emphasized fundamental institutions in bringing about a major impact
on economic outcomes (Hall and Jones 1999, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, Rodrik,
Subramaniam and Trebbi 2002). In this line of research, institutions may have a direct e⁄ect
on economic outcomes, as well as an indirect e⁄ect, because they in￿ uence the form and rate of
technological progress and they shape the incentives of agents (Helpman 2008). We shed new
light on this question by examining whether the impact of steam trains on market size is a⁄ected
either by proximate or by more fundamental institutional factors. As a proximate determinant,
we ask whether trains have a stronger impact when they are run by private agents, as opposed
3Henderson (1959, 21).
4Viner (1950, 97).
2to the state.5 We also examine whether steam trains had a stronger impact on market size in
states that abolished serfdom relatively early, hypothesizing that early abolition of serfdom is
a general sign of institutional quality.6
Our setting has a number of advantages. First, by covering the entire 19th century, we
can observe many episodes of change. Moreover, the economies are going through both insti-
tutional and technological change, so that the impacts for the same set of economies can be
compared. Second, the economies of 19th century Europe also proceeded at di⁄erent speeds in
the implementation of customs, currency, and transportation changes. This is crucial since one
can look for corresponding e⁄ects on market size at di⁄erent times across economies. Third,
these economies also had di⁄erent institutional fundamentals, and this allows us to make some
headway towards separating the direct and indirect e⁄ects of institutions on market size.
We ￿nd that both institutional change through currency agreements and customs liber-
alizations and technological change through the adoption of steam trains were important in
increasing the size of the market in 19th century Europe, accounting for almost all of the
decline in price gaps. However, the impact of steam trains is found to be larger than the
customs and currency e⁄ects. We also ￿nd support for both proximate and fundamental in-
stitutions a⁄ecting technological change, thereby providing some initial evidence for indirect
e⁄ects of institutions via their impact on the rate technological change.
Transportation technology improvements have often been seen as a crucial factor for reshap-
ing the geography of trade. The arrival of more e¢ cient transatlantic shipping led to important
5This question is often emphasized in the literature, with the general presumption that private railways
would be more e¢ cient; for the case of Germany, see, e.g., Fremdling (1975, 109-132).
6Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson, and Robinson (2008) study the impact of the French Revolution, showing
that the existence of serfdom, as one of the core feudal institutions, is a good indicator for institutional quality,
and negatively correlated to economic outcomes.
3changes in the late 19th century (Harley 1988, O￿ Rourke and Williamson 1999), while container
shipping and air freight may have increased o⁄shoring during the late 20th century (Hummels
2007). While many writers would agree that steam railways revolutionized transport technology
during the 19th century, not all earlier studies bear out the large impact of rails (Fogel 1964,
Fishlow 1965, and Williamson 1980).7 One advantage of our approach to transport technology
is that it employs economy pair-speci￿c information on the establishment of rail connections,
and moreover, this includes crucial geographic factors a⁄ecting steam train availability.8 This
analysis is unique in comparing causal e⁄ects from customs liberalization, currency agreements
and transportation innovations using economy-speci￿c information on all three mechanisms.
Even if there is general agreement that declining transport costs, both now and in the 19th
century, have a bearing on world trade, the recent emphasis has shifted to non-transport cost
factors, especially payment frictions (Alesina and Barro 2002, Eichengreen and Irwin 1995,
Flandreau and Maurel 2001, Frankel and Rose 2002, and Rose 2000).9 Several authors have
also simultaneously examined, as do we, the impact of customs liberalizations.10 In this respect,
our work is closely related to Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) and Lopez-Cordova and
Meissner (2003), who estimate that bilateral trade in the late 19th century was substantially
higher if both partners were signatories of a monetary agreement, the gold standard, than if
7Cameron and Neal (2003, 199); they go on to write "[Railroads] were both the symbols and the instruments
of industrialization. Before the railways inadequate transportation facilities constituted a major obstacle to
industrialization in both continental Europe and the United States."
8Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor￿ s (2003) main information on transport cost is Isserlis￿(1938) freight
cost index, which is based on British rates. For a global sample, this introduces measurement error; as noted in
Isserlis, e.g., British ships carried less than 10% of trade between two foreign ports at the time (p.139). Jacks
and Pendakur (2008) suggest to combine the maritime trade cost information with overland rates, noting that
O￿ Rourke and Williamson (1994) show that much of the decrease in price di⁄erentials between the UK and US
after 1850 was due to lower transport costs between the Midwest and the East Coast of the US.
9Glick and Taylor (2008) document the disruptive e⁄ects of wars on trade. See also Jacks (2005, 2006) who
studies a broad range of transportation and non-transportation factors.
10On customs liberalizations, see also Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Rose (2004), and Subramanian and Wei
(2006).
4they were o⁄ the gold standard. Our study di⁄ers from theirs in that we consider a period
starting 70 years earlier. We also conduct an instrumental variable analysis that is compelling,
we believe, in picking up on key historical facts to establish that the timing of institutional
change in 19th century Europe was systematically related to the economies￿speci￿c costs and
bene￿ts. The results are substantively di⁄erent from what comes out of treating institutional
change as exogenous.11
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 highlights the convergence of prices
in 19th century Europe, and presents preliminary evidence on the importance of institutional
and technological change in this. We also provide some historical background for customs
liberalization, currency agreements, and steam train adoption during this period. Our data is
decribed in section 3. The empirical results on their importance for increases in market size
are presented in section 4, where we also report evidence for the impact of institutions on the
rate of technological change. The concluding section 5 summarizes our results and suggests
directions for future research.
2 Price Convergence in 19th Century Europe: the Zol-
lverein, Currency Agreements, and Steam Trains
Consider the European cities Berlin, Brussels, and Munster. The ￿rst was the capital of Prussia,
and later, of the German Reich. The second is the capital of Belgium (founded in 1830), and
11Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) ￿nd instrumental variable (IV) estimates that are similar to OLS
estimates, while Lopez-Cordova and Meissner￿ s (2003) ￿nd no evidence for endogeneity. Ritschl and Wolf￿ s
(2003) focus is on showing that a high propensity to trade leads to currency agreements rather than estimating
the causal impact of them on trade. For the later part of the 20th century, Barro and Tenreyo￿ s (2004) IV
analysis shows that the strong e⁄ect of currency unions on trade found in Rose (2000) and others is not subject
to endogeneity bias.
5Munster was the capital of the Prussian province of Westfalia. Figure 1 shows the location of
all three cities on a map. Between Berlin and Munster, customs borders were removed in the
year 1831, while between Berlin and Brussels, customs borders remained. Does this customs
liberalization explain why between 1830 and 1855, the Berlin-Munster relative price gap for
wheat fell by 0.12, while for Berlin-Brussels it fell only by about 0.02?
A priori, it is plausible that customs liberalization did indeed play a role. However, the
period 1830-55 witnessed not only customs liberalization, but also, in the year 1848, the arrival
of a steam train connection between Berlin and Munster, while a train connection between
Berlin and Brussels was not available until 1859. Hence, it would be hard to argue that the
di⁄erence in price gap reduction of 0.10 (0.12 minus 0.02) is due to customs liberalization alone.
There are also the German cities of Nurnberg, and Parchim. The former is a major city in
Bavaria, while Parchim was a smaller town in the state of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, in Germany￿ s
far North (see Figure 1). Between Berlin and Nurnberg, it was possible to transport wheat on
trains from the year 1851 on, while between Berlin and Parchim, such transport was possible
only from the year 1880 on. Does this di⁄erence in the transport options explain why between
1830 and 1855, the Berlin-Nurnberg relative price gap for wheat fell by 0.18, while for Berlin-
Parchim it fell only by about 0.01?
Trains may have brought down the Berlin-Nurnberg price gap faster than for Berlin-Parchim.
However, Berlin and Nurnberg also became members of the Zollverein in 1834, while Parchim
joined it only in 1867. Moreover, it is surely no accident that trains connected the relatively
important cities of Berlin and Nurnberg three decades before it was possible to transport grain
by steam train from Berlin to the less important town of Parchim. The marginal contribution
from trains on relative price gaps may therefore be di⁄erent than what these ￿gures indicate.
6As a ￿rst cut, then, the evidence is consistent with customs liberalization, train transport,
and also currency agreements each expanding market size. At the same time, it is also instruc-
tive to review what is known about the perceptions of those who lived in these areas at the
time.
It was recognized early on that internal trade in Germany was hampered by the multiple
customs borders. The economist Friedrich List, head of the Union of Merchants (der Deutsche
Handels- and Gewerbeverein), expressed this in a petition to the German parliament in the
year 1819 as follows: the numerous customs barriers
￿cripple internal trade and produce the same e⁄ect as ligatures which prevent the
free circulation of blood. The merchants trading between Hamburg and Austria,
or Berlin and Switzerland must traverse ten states, must learn ten customs tari⁄s,
must pay ten successive transit dues. Anyone who is unfortunate enough as to live
on the boundary line between three or four states spends his days among hostile
tax-gatherers and customs house o¢ cials. He is a man without country.￿ 12
The customs situation in Germany was also unfavorably compared with that in other major
countries, such as France. In the words of List, the situation is
￿depressing for [German] men who want to act and trade. With envious eyes they
look across the Rhine river, where a large nation, from the Canal to the Mediter-
anean Sea, from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, from the border with the Netherlands to
Italy, engages in trade on open rivers and roads without ever encountering a single
customs o¢ cial.￿ 13
12The petition is printed in German in von Eisenhart Rothe and Ritthaler (1934, 320-324).
13Ibid.
7The support for a removal of customs borders was broad and went beyond merchants,
agriculturalists and industrialists.14 For example, Goethe emphasized both the importance of
currency agreements as well as customs liberalization. He said that he would look forward to
a time when
￿the German Thaler and Groschen will have the same value throughout the entire
country and my luggage may pass unopened through all thirty-six German states.￿ 15
There were also some voices opposing economic liberalization in Germany, especially in the
early 1800s. They included political progressives, who would however typically not oppose
liberalization per se, but liberalization under the leadership of Prussia, which they considered
as politically undesirable.16 These views waned over time, with the increasing recognition that
there was no way to German economic liberalization other than under Prussia￿ s leadership.
Also the nobility leading the smaller and mid-sized German states was often hesitant about
economic liberalization in Germany, mostly because they feared the possibly accompanying
political changes that would result in a loss in their personal power. However, at times the
economic imperatives were overwhelming. For example, Ludwig I, the king of Bavaria, strongly
supported customs liberalizations with Prussia in the year 1833, because he expected that
the economic costs imposed by customs borders would fuel political unrest in the population,
thereby leading to a revolution and a loss of his legitimacy (Hahn 1984, 73-75).
The following gives a brief overview of how customs and currency agreements as well as
steam trains changed the economic landscape in 19th century Central Europe.
14See Henderson (1959), Hahn (1984). This is not to say that merchants, agriculturalists and industrialists
everywhere were in favor of customs liberalization. For example, industrial producers in the South German
states of Baden, Bavaria, and Wurttemberg complained about the new competition from Prussian and Saxon
products after the 1834 Zollverein treaty (Hahn 1984, 94).
15Goethe in conversation with Eckermann in the year 1828; see Goethe (1828).
16Several of the Southern German states had by then adopted constitutions, which Prussia had not.
82.1 The Zollverein
The Zollverein was the most important institutional development in the move towards trade
liberalization in 19th century continental Europe. Other treaties can be found, but none were
as encompassing or long-lived. The main economic impact of the Zollverein treaties was the
abolishment of tari⁄barriers among member states, and the implementation of a single external
tari⁄ for non-members. As of 1815, Germany￿ s political structure was divided into the thirty-
nine states of the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund), see Figure 1. The confederation
consisted of sovereign states in which joint action depended upon unanimity. Austria was
initially the most powerful of the German states, followed by Prussia. Individual states tended
to be highly protectionist and the tari⁄s that were imposed were complicated. There is no
reliable information on enforcement, but it was likely that it was costly especially for the many
small states to each monitor its own borders.
In the aftermath of debts from a decade of war, and new tari⁄s raised by Britain, Russia,
Austria, France, and the Netherlands, Prussia sought to negotiate treaties with her neighbors
while reforming internal tari⁄s. This was particularly pressing because Prussia￿ s territories were
divided into two, an eastern portion consisting of seven provinces, and a western portion that
included the Rhineland provinces and the Ruhr area. In the year 1818, the Prussian Customs
Union was formed. With few exceptions, internal dues were abolished, and by 1821 only a
single tari⁄ for the entire Kingdom was levied, while transit dues on goods passing through
Prussia were reduced. The importance of the Prussian Customs Union stems from the fact that
it served as a model for most of the Zollverein treaties that followed.
Enclaves within Prussia were the ￿rst to develop agreements with Prussia on how its pay-
ment of duties were to be treated￿ with Prussia deciding to treat the enclaves as her own
9territory rather than as foreign states required to pay import duties. As with all of the follow-
ing treaties, these were based on the principle that states that adopted the Prussian system of
tari⁄ received a share of the joint revenue based on population size. Their rights as sovereign
states were maintained.17
Hesse-Darmstadt was the ￿rst territorially separate state to join the Prussian Customs
Union in the year 1828, while Hesse-Cassel became the next to join in 1831. The latter was
signi￿cant because it meant that the East and West Prussian provinces were joined without
a customs border for the ￿rst time. It also meant that British goods could no longer reach
Frankfurt and Germany￿ s south without crossing a Prussian external tari⁄ border; see Figure
1. In the year 1834, the Thuringian states, the Kingdom of Saxony, and the 1828 formed
South German Customs Union (consisting of Wurttemberg and Bavaria) joined the augmented
Prussian Customs Union to become the German Zollverein. At that point the Zollverein had
an area of about 163,000 square miles and a population of about 23.5 million people.
By stages, other states entered. Three other German states joined the Zollverein between
mid-1835 and early 1836: Baden, Hesse-Nassau, and the Free City of Frankfurt. The entry
of Baden was signi￿cant because it meant that the two separate areas of Bavaria were joined
without custom borders. The entry of Frankfurt meant that it was possible to trade manu-
facturing goods from Frankfurt up the Main River to Northern Bavaria in exchange for grain
without paying customs duties. Later on, Brunswick became a member of the Zollverein in
1841, Hanover in 1851, Oldenburg in 1852, and Mecklenburg as well as the Free City of L￿beck
in 1867. Two states became members of the Zollverein only after Germany became politically
uni￿ed in 1871, namely the Free Cities of Bremen and Hamburg in 1888. Thus, the process
17Throughout, Prussia reserved the right to negotiate with foreign countries such as France, Belgium, and
England for itself.
10of customs union enlargement materialized over a large part of the century (the years 1828 to
1888). Austria-Hungary did not become member of the Zollverein.
There are a number of possible reasons for states wanting to join the Zollverein. Market
access was certainly a major motive. For any state considering whether or not to join the
Zollverein, one advantage was tari⁄-free access to the large market of Prussia, which included
the leading industrial areas of Germany at this time. In general, however, the states located
in Germany￿ s South joined the Zollverein earlier because not joining implied having to pay
hefty tolls in order to reach the Baltic or North Sea coast. This was important, ￿rst, because
it gave access to trade with the emerging industrial powers, in particular England. Moreover,
it was the Southern states￿main access to sea ports, since the Alps e⁄ectively blocked o⁄trade
to southern ports. Thus, the Southern German states of Baden, W￿rttemberg and Bavaria
had all joined the Zollverein by 1836, whereas the Mecklenburg states, located directly on the
Baltic coast, joined only in 1867, and the city states of Hamburg and Bremen, which relied
particularly heavily on international trade, joined only in 1888.
Fiscal reasons may well have also been part of the calculus, but it is di¢ cult to ￿nd general
patterns. For many of the relatively small states, it was prohibitively costly to establish and
enforce tari⁄ borders, and they preferred joining the Prussian-led customs union in exchange
for a fraction of the joint tari⁄revenue (Dumke 1976, Chapter 1). At the same time, this cannot
be the full explanation since there were several highly indebted and small states that joined
the Zollverein relatively late. Some of the smaller and mid-sized German states may also have
hesitated to join the Zollverein because they preferred more trade protection than the external
tari⁄ preferred by Prussia provided. However, Prussia￿ s tari⁄s on a range of goods, especially
Kolonialwaren such as tobacco, tea, and sugar, were actually higher than the tari⁄s of other
11German states before they joined the Zollverein, so the desire for more protection can hardly
be the main reason for not joining the Zollverein.18 Other reasons for joining the Zollverein
were idiosyncratic. For example, Hanover joined relatively late in part because it was governed
in personal union with England, which had no interest in an all-inclusive Prussian led customs
union in the center of Europe. Overall, the key motive for joining the Zollverein was likely
market access, and we will return to this question in the empirical analysis below.
Since the Zollverein was a customs union, joining it was not identical to a move towards
multilateral free trade. Trade diversion was a possible outcome. However, most of trade of the
German states at the time was with other German states, and a substantial share of imports
were consumption goods that were hardly produced in Europe (such as tobacco, sugar, and
spices). Therefore, the trade diversion e⁄ect of the Zollverein was rather limited, and thus the
basic character of the Zollverein was trade-liberalizing..
2.2 Currency Agreements
In the ￿rst decades of the 19th century, Germany was replete with coins issued by its many
di⁄erent states. The diversity was immense, in sharp contrast to the uni￿ed monetary conditions
in Great Britain and France, for example.19 In the Southern states, the dominating currency
was the Gulden, as it was also called in the empire of Austria-Hungary, while in the Northern
states the currency was typically called Thaler. Irrespective of the name, each state minted
its own currency, and initially currencies did not have legal-tender status outside of a given
state. The currencies were linked to silver by the currency unit expressed in equivalent to a
certain quantity of silver weighted in Cologne Mark. Comparability of coins even of the same
18See Dumke (1976) for more details.
19Holtfrerich (1989, 1993).
12denomination, like Gulden, was di¢ cult because the mints in di⁄erent states had di⁄erent
coinage fees. This meant that the net silver weight of Gulden from di⁄erent states would
actually di⁄er. During the 1820s, the state of Hesse-Nassau for example went as far as to melt
down high-silver content coins issued in Bavaria to produce its own low-silver content coins,
and pocket the di⁄erence (Holtfrerich 1993). The dividing line between full-value specie money
and debased coins was therefore ￿ uid.
The South German states put an end to this through the Munich Coin Treaty of 1837.20
It stipulated that the silver content of the Gulden should be the same (nine-tenth of face
value), no matter which state minted it. This e⁄ectively meant the ￿xing of exchange rates
among the Southern states￿currencies from this date on. Importantly, Gulden coins minted
in any of the Southern states would have legal-tender status in all signatory states. One year
later, the Dresden Coin Convention in 1838 e⁄ectively led to ￿xed exchange rates between all
Zollverein currencies by requiring that each state was obliged to mint coins according to the
common metal-content speci￿cations. However, the 1838 Dresden agreement did not give legal
tender status to all currencies throughout the Zollverein. This created an important barrier to
commercial exchange. The Dresden agreement left the Northern Thaler bloc and the Southern
Gulden bloc intact, even though currencies in both blocs were linked to the Cologne Mark at
a ￿xed exchange rate of 1 Thaler = 1.75 Gulden.
It was recognized at the time that a generally accepted medium of exchange is important for
facilitating trade. In fact, the states agreed on the minting of a common coin worth 2 Thaler
or 3.5 Gulden that would have full legal tender status throughout (called the "Vereinsthaler").
In part because its denomination was too large for everyday small-scale business, the coin
20These Southern states are Bavaria, Baden, W￿rttemberg, Hesse-Nassau, Hesse-Darmstadt, and the Free
City of Frankfurt.
13never played the role for which it was introduced.21 Instead, the Prussian one-Thaler piece was
increasingly used for commercial transactions after 1838, and even gained de facto acceptance in
the Gulden states of Southern Germany. The need for a generally accepted medium of exchange
was remedied only twenty years later, in the Vienna Coin Treaty of 1857, where all Zollverein
currencies were given full legal tender status throughout the Zollverein (even retrospectively
to those coins minted between 1838 and 1857). The states that remained outside the Vienna
currency agreement of 1857 in our sample are Mecklenburg-Schwerin and the Free Cities of
Bremen, Hamburg, and L￿beck (Willis 1896).
Monetary uni￿cation was achieved with political uni￿cation of Germany soon after the year
1871. The newly created Reichsmark had full legal tender status in all German states. Also,
Germany moved from the silver to the gold standard after the year 1871, in line with the
international trend at the time.22
2.3 The Introduction of Steam Trains
European economic growth from the 19th century on also coincided with a series of innovations
in transportation.23 These innovations included paved roads, improvements in waterways,
railways, in materials such as iron and steel, and later on, steam power, but the rapid increase
of railway construction was particularly important. In the 1830s and 1840s British suppliers
of locomotives dominated the market, and railway iron exports were an important export for
Britain, while countries on the continent started to produce their own railway inputs at a later
21The signatories expected that by the year 1842, the Vereinsthaler would account for 1.2% of the total coin
circulation in Germany. In fact, the Vereinsthaler circulation fell well short of this; Holtfrerich (1993).
22In our sample, the Netherlands was on the gold standard by 1875, while Belgium and France were on the
gold standard by 1880 (Lopez-Cordova and Meissner 2003).
23A good survey is O￿ Brien (1983). On the debate concerning the contribution of railways in the United
States, see Fogel (1964), Fishlow (1965), and Williamson (1980).
14stage.
The ￿rst German railway was opened in December 1835. With only 4 miles of tracks, it was
a short suburban line located in Bavaria, between Nurnberg and F￿rth. The ￿rst longer route
(70 miles) was built in Saxony in 1839, some 5 years after the initial Zollverein treaties came
into e⁄ect. Thereafter, additional miles of rail were laid down swiftly. By 1847, there were over
2,000 miles of rail in Germany (Henderson 1959, 147), and almost all main railway lines were
completed by 1877 (Milward and Saul 1977, 42).
Railway building in the ￿ve sample countries other than Germany, namely Austria-Hungary,
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, proceeded in quite di⁄erent ways. In
France, railway construction began as early as 1828 with 23 kilometers of track opened, but
its pace fell behind that of Germany in part because of resistance to the new technology
from owners of other means of transportation. It has been argued that railway building in
Germany has been particularly fast because the various politically independent states competed
for transport routes through their territitories (Fremdling et al. 1995). At the same time,
railway building in Belgium was also very swift. The Belgium railways were designed as a
means of international transport from the beginning. This meant that negotiations among
di⁄erent states were necessary. In 1834, the Belgium Parliament planned for a network that
allowed connections to Prussia, France, England, and the sea at Anvers, and later, an extension
to Holland (La⁄ut 1983). In Switzerland, both the di¢ cult geography as well as the highly
federalistic (cantonal) system slowed down railway building. Also in Austria-Hungary, railway
building proceeded at a moderate pace; major reasons for that include relatively little interest
in the new technology among the empire￿ s leaders, as well as empty state budgets and lost wars
starting around the mid-19th century.
15How important were railways as a means of transportation for grain? Generally, railways
were important for low value-to-weight ratio good such as coal, construction materials, metal
goods, and also grain (O￿ Brien 1983, 1-2). At the same time, the importance of railroads for
transporting grain varied greatly. While it was cheaper to transport grain by railroads than
by other means of land transport, trains could not compete with transport by ship. In the
late 19th century, for example, sending grain from Posen (in East Prussia) to Cologne by train
was at least three times as expensive as shipping it to Rotterdam or Antwerp and then up the
Rhine river (K￿ttgen 1890, 64).
Consequently, long distance grain trade in the southeast direction, parallel to the major
rivers (Elbe, Rhine, and Danube), was hardly ever done by rail. At the same time, transporta-
tion of grain on railways was of utmost importance when it connected the drainage areas of the
main rivers.24 Grain transportation on railways was also of major signi￿cance whenever sea or
river transport, even if indirect, was not an option. For example, the great majority of all grain
exported from Bavaria to Switzerland in the early 1850s was transported on railways (Seu⁄ert
1857, Chapters 5, 6). The attractiveness of transporting grain on railways was not only a⁄ected
by geographic features. Also the freight rates per ton-kilometer mattered, and while we do not
have fully detailed information on this, we know that they di⁄ered both across states as well as
over time (Hohorst and Fremdling 1979, 64-65). The existence of a train connection therefore
does not say everything on the importance of a particular train track for grain trade. The
signi￿cance of railways for grain trade varied for a number of reasons between di⁄erent market
pairs, and the estimation will take this into account.
24For example, the completion of the K￿ln-Mindener railway in the year 1847 was crucial for transporting
the relatively cheap Prussian grain to the emerging industrial areas of the Rhine-Ruhr (Fremdling and Hohorst
1979, 64). At the same time, the availability of paved roads and canals also in￿ uenced how important steam
railroads were.
16We now turn to a description of the data.
3 Data
This study employs the price for wheat across markets in Europe to analyze trade and the size
of the market. We have compiled a data set consisting of sixty-eight market locations; Table 1
provides an overview. There are 16 markets, or about 24% of the sample, in Austria-Hungary,
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The remaining 52 wheat price series are
for markets located in ￿fteen di⁄erent German states.25 The prices are averages for an entire
year, which is appropriate since we are interested in low-frequency changes of price gaps over
an entire century. All prices are quoted in terms of Bavarian Gulden per Bavarian Schae⁄el
(about 223 liter of wheat). To arrive at a comparable set of prices we have converted the
many di⁄erent quantity and monetary units that were used in 19th century Europe using the
conversion rates given in Seu⁄ert (1857) as well as in the original sources.26
The overall sample period is 1800 to 1899, but data availability varies greatly across the
series. For example, there are all 100 annual price observations for the city of Brugge during
the 19th century, while for the market in Wiesbaden, there is only one single observation. Since
the goal is to rely on important time-series variation (before-after comparison), it is clear that
25These German states are the Grand Duchy of Baden, The Kingdom of Bavaria, the Duchy of Brunswick,
the Free City of Bremen, the Free City of Frankfurt/Main, the Free City of Hamburg, the Free City of L￿beck,
the Kingdom of Hannover, the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel, the Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Duchy of
Hesse-Nassau, the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the Kingdom of Prussia, the Kingdom of Saxony,
and the Kingdom of W￿rttemberg. Some of these territories changed their name during the 19th century, for
instance the Kingdom of Hannover, which was an Electorate until 1814. All of these territories became part of
the German Reich after the year 1871.
26The rates of in￿ ation might have di⁄ered across markets, but information on in￿ ation rates or exchange
rates for all currencies and all years are unfortunately not available. Both the levels as well as di⁄erences in
in￿ ation rates across states have tended to fall over the 19th century, and the currency agreements have likely
played a role in this. We include state-pair ￿xed e⁄ects in the analysis to reduce any bias.
17more weight should be placed on markets where prices are observed for a long time. Table
1 reports the number of observations for each market as well as the year of the earliest price
observation during the 19th century.
Grain prices in Europe at the time generally increased from the South (the Black Sea
area) and East (Eastern Prussia) to the Northwest (Northern Germany, the Canal region, and
England). The average percentage price gap between two markets in our sample is about 0.18
over the entire 19th century. For the subset of price gaps for which we have information for
the entire century, the average price gap in the ￿rst decade of the 19th century is about 0.32,
while in the last decade of the 19th century it is, with 0.10, less than one third of that. This
decline re￿ ects that dramatic extent of price convergence over the 19th century.
To understand the roles of customs liberalization, currency agreements, and steam railways
in price convergence, we coded data on each. For each city-market, we have recorded the
year in which it became part of the Zollverein; this year is listed in Table 1.27 Important
accession dates are 1834 and 1836, as well as the years 1841 (Brunswick), 1854 (Hanover),
1867 (Mecklenburg and L￿beck), and 1888 (Bremen and Hamburg). Generally, joining the
Zollverein meant that barriers for grain trade between any two of its markets would be equal
to zero. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive information on the levels of tari⁄s on grain
before liberalization. Some available ￿gures suggest that the duties on wheat may have been on
average the equivalent of about 10 percent ad valorem.28 Instead of exploiting the size of the
tari⁄ change, we rely on the timing of the move towards zero trade barriers through Zollverein
27Customs liberalizations that did not involve Zollverein accession are discussed in section 4.
28At the time, mostly speci￿c duties were charged, so that the ad valorem duty varied with the price of wheat.
In the year 1831, the augmented Prussian customs union charged a speci￿c duty equivalent to about 7% for
wheat. The ad valorem equivalents for "products of agriculture" before the formation of the Zollverein in 1834
were about 16% in Prussia, 9% in Bavaria and Wurttemberg, 8% in Baden, and 3% in Saxony (Dumke 1976,
Tables 3.16, 3.17).
18membership.29
Even though within states tari⁄s were generally abolished in the very early 1800s, there
could still have been customs borders faced by agents trading within the same state. This is
in part because the territory of several states consisted of several non-contiguous parts, such
as the Eastern and Western provinces of Prussia, or the Bavarian Palatinate area that was
separate from core Bavaria around Nurnberg and Munich. For each market pair in our sample,
we have established using historical maps whether a direct trade route would involve passing
any customs borders. If the number of customs borders to be crossed is greater than or equal
to one, CUijt is coded as 0, otherwise it is 1, for each market pair ij and year t. For any
relationship between a German and a non-German market, or between two markets in di⁄erent
European countries, CUijt is equal to 0 for all years. For example, the customs variable CUijt
turns to 1 for the pair Berlin-Nurnberg in 1834 (the year of the Zollverein foundation), it
changes from 0 to 1 for Berlin and Parchim in 1867 (with Mecklenburg-Schwerin￿ s Zollverein
accession), and between Berlin and Brussels, CUijt takes on the value 0 throughout the sample
period (see Figure 1).
Turning to monetary agreements, a major step was for currencies to have full legal tender
status in other states. As discussed above, this occurred between the Southern states in 1837
with the Munich Coin Treaty. For all Zollverein currencies, full legal tender status was agreed
upon with the Vienna Coin Treaty of 1857. Thus, for example, the variable LTijt for the pair
of Munich (in Bavaria) and Stuttgart (Wurttemberg) up to the year 1837 is equal to 0 and 1
afterwards. In contrast, the variable LTijt for the pair Berlin (Prussia) and Stuttgart is 0 up to
29In a few cases, the time of the Zollverein accession does not coincide with the year in which tari⁄s on
grain were eliminated. For example, the tari⁄s between Bavaria and the augmented Prussian customs union
were eliminated in 1829, four years before the initial Zollverein treaty. We focus nevertheless on the Zollverein
accession date, because this played the key role in terms of commitment.
19the year 1857, and 1 afterwards. For relations between a German and a non-German market,
LTijt is always 0. Table 1 gives the year in which the currency used in a particular city had for
the ￿rst time full legal tender status in another state.30
Table 1 gives also the year in which a particular city-market had its earliest bilateral rail
connection in our sample. For example, the rail track between the Saxony cities of Dresden
and Leipzig was completed in the year 1839, and since this was the earliest connection in the
sample for both cities, Table 1 lists this year for Dresden and Leipzig. The trains variable TRijt
for the Dresden-Leipzig pair is 0 until the year 1839, and 1 thereafter.
This coding is not based on when a particular city became part of the railway network
by getting its railway station, which in itself may not be particularly important. Instead,
we code the TR variable speci￿c to bilateral connections in our sample. Moreover, since it
clearly matters for the choice between di⁄erent modes of transport how circuitous the route
between two markets is, we have set TRijt only equal to one once a direct and non-circuitous
train connection existed. This has been determined by analyzing historical maps that give the
precise geographic location of the historical train tracks in Europe. For example, Figure 2 shows
the train connections in the year 1850, as well as the four cities Strassbourg, Munich, Hamburg,
and Cologne. In the following year, 1851, the North-South connection between Munich and
Hamburg was established, and the variable TRijt switches from 0 to 1 in our analysis.
The TR variable also incorporates other relevant elements of Europe￿ s topography, such
as the existence of bridges across rivers. For example, the railway line between Cologne and
30The two Alsatian cities of Mulhouse and Strassbourg are special cases, since they were part of France until
1871 and part of Germany from 1871 to 1918. Thus, the value of LTijt between Mulhouse and Toulouse, e.g.,
goes from 1 to 0 after 1871. Moreover, we could in principle take into account the fact that the uni￿ed Germany
and other countries in our sample went on the gold standard in the 1870s. We have not done so mainly because
being on the same commodity standard is not identical to mutually agreed upon legal tender status. We have
also considered the e⁄ects of ￿xing exchange rates on the price gaps. Incorporating this into our analysis does
not qualitatively change our ￿ndings.
20Aachen was an early one in Europe, completed in the year 1841, and as early as 1843 this
line connected internationally to the Belgian cities of Brussels and Brugge. Grain from the
relatively low-price areas of Prussia could be shipped via Hanover to the emerging industrial
areas of Cologne by the year 1847 via the K￿ln-Mindener line. But that was only the Cologne-
Deutz part of Cologne, located on the east side of the Rhine￿ the railway bridge across the
Rhine was completed only in the year 1859, and until then, Aachen as well as the Belgian
markets could e⁄ectively not be supplied by rail with the relatively cheap Eastern European
grain.31
Below we also employ information on when states formally abolished serfdom as an indicator
of institutional quality. Late abolition of serfdom is taken as a sign of institutions that are not
conducive to economic e¢ ciency and growth, consistent with Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson,
and Robinson (2008) who show that prosperity in 19th century Europe was lower when the
prevalence of feudal institutions increased. Such institutions might also a⁄ect the e¢ ciency of
steam trains. Table A6 of the appendix reports the year of the initial decree abolishing serfdom
is presented for our markets. The average year is 1809, with the earliest year being 1783 (Grand
Duchy of Baden) and the latest year being 1848 (Austria-Hungary).
Finally, we analyze whether state and private railways had di⁄erent impacts on trade and
the size of the market. On the one hand, private railways might emerge whenever e¢ ciency
gains outweigh the cost of adoption, whereas state railway might serve also purposes other than
economic e¢ ciency. On the other, there might be market failures, for example imperfect capital
31We have also experimented with another railway variable that incorporates information on how much freight
tra¢ c was present on a given rail line in a given year, based on information in Fremdling et al. (1995). This
takes into account di⁄erences in the relative importance of rail connections for freight tra¢ c. Moreover, the
actual freight tra¢ c ￿gures also re￿ ect di⁄erences across rail lines and over time in terms of freight charges per
ton-kilometer. Results with this alternative variable were found to be similar.
21markets, that the state railways might be able to overcome. We have evaluated the historical
record to determine whether state or private railways were most important for each of the 68
markets in our sample, and the result is shown also in Table A6 of the appendix.32
Data sources Major sources for the wheat price data are Shiue and Keller (2007) as well as
Seu⁄ert (1857). The information on trains comes mainly from IEG (2008) and Putzger (1997).
The customs liberalization and currency agreement variables are based on the accounts in Hen-
derson (1959), Hahn (1984), and Willis (1896), as well as historical maps at IEG (2008). For
population data, we draw on Bairoch et al. (1988), de Vries (1984), Kunz (2008) and Mitchell
(1980). The institutional variables are based on Blum (1978) and Fremdling, Federspiel, and
Kunz (1995) for the abolition of serfdom and state versus private railways, respectively. Addi-
tional details can be found in the appendix.
We now turn to the empirical analysis.
4 Empirical Results
To assess the importance of customs liberalization in bringing down price gaps between markets,
consider the following regression:
pdifijt = ￿0 + ￿1CUijt + ￿X
0
+ "ijt (1)
32The key criteria is whether the state had an important role in ￿nancing and in operating the railway early
on. Since private operators typically needed a concession (license) awarded by the government, the state had
always some role in the decision to adopt steam trains. While typically states adopted either private or state
railway systems, this is not the case for Prussia and Bavaria, which had mixed systems. Our analysis takes this
into account.
22which relates the log absolute bilateral price gap between markets i and j in year t to the
dichotomous customs liberalization variable CUijt and a vector of control variables X. We are
interested in estimating ￿1. The concern is that customs liberalizations were not exogenous,
so that CUijt is correlated with "ijt and OLS estimates are inconsistent. To address this, we
adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach:
pdifijt = ￿0 + ￿1CUijt + ￿X
0 + "ijt
CUijt = ￿0 + ￿1DistCoastij + ￿2ZollPopijt + ￿X0 + vijt
(2)
where DistCoastij and ZollPopijt are two instruments for customs liberalization. The ￿rst
captures the distance of markets to the coast. Almost all of the customs liberalizations between
cities in this sample were due to the enlargement of the Zollverein. Moreover, the date of a
state￿ s accession to the Zollverein is clearly related to the distance to the coast, with more
distant markets joining earlier. Not being a member of the Zollverein mattered more for the
states in the South of Germany, since the external tari⁄ of the Zollverein prevented customs-
free access to the coast, which gave relatively low-transport access to distant markets. It is thus
not surprising that by the year 1836, all German states to the south of Prussia had joined the
Zollverein, see Figure 3. As one would expect, based on this there is a strong cross-sectional
relationship between the distance to the coast and the year of Zollverein accession (R2 of 0.48,
see Figure A1 in the Appendix).
The bilateral variable DistCoastij equals the minimum of the distance to the coast for
market i and for market j. If at least one of the markets is located near the coast, customs
between i and j would tend to be not liberalized. To gain precision, we add a second instrument
23based on the distance-weighted Zollverein population in that particular year, ZollPopijt; it is
de￿ned as the log average of the distance-weighted Zollverein populations in market i and j,








Here, Popst is the population of state or country s in year t; dis is the geographic distance
between market i to the capital of state s, and IZV
st is an indicator variable that is equal to one
if state s in year t was part of the Zollverein, and zero otherwise. A larger Zollverein population
means a larger customs-free internal market in the customs union, and thus the greater is the
incentive to join. Note that this variable changes over time while the distance-to-coast variable
does not.
We adopt analogous IV approaches for trains and currency agreements, with the following
instrumental variables. The size of the markets that the railway would connect was an important
consideration for rail construction. There is a strong cross-sectional relationship between city
population in the year 1800, which pre-dates railway construction anywhere, and the earliest
date at which a city-market had a railway connection (shown in the Appendix, Figure A2).
This indicates that on average, larger cities adopted railways earlier than smaller cities. The
￿rst bilateral instrumental variable for TR is the average of the population sizes in city i and
city j in the year 1800 (denoted Size1800ij).
Also the market potentials of locations i and j are employed to predict whether there





dis , 8i;t. A stylized fact in regional economics is that a location￿ s market
24potential is a strong predictor of its economic potential (Harris 1954). Since a city￿ s market
potential is computed from the distance-weighted sizes of all states in the sample, the in￿ uence
of the city￿ s size itself on its market potential is negligible. This is relevant for the exclusion
restriction, because it reduces the likelihood that the instrument varies systematically with
characteristics that determine the price gap between markets i and j: The market potential
of markets i and j at time t, Market_Potentialijt; is de￿ned as the log average of MPit and
MPjt, for all pairs ij and years t.
We construct also two instruments for the currency agreement variable. The ￿rst is based on
the extent to which monetary systems imposed di⁄erential transactions costs for trade between
market pairs. In the Southern German states, transactions costs were particularly high because
coins from di⁄erent states had highly varying silver contents even though they had the same
face value, one Gulden. These states had relatively more to gain from currency agreements,
and the Southern German states formed currency agreements before other states did. The
instrument for the bilateral LTijt variable is a dichotomous variable that is equal to one if both
markets i and j belong to the Gulden area, and zero if at least one of the markets is not part
of the Gulden area (the instrument is denoted by Gulden1754). This Gulden area was formed
about half a century before the sample period begins, in the year 1754. A second instrument for
currency agreements is created as the distance-weighted log average population covered by full
legal tender status, denoted by CurrPopijt: It is de￿ned as the Zollverein population variable
above, except that an indicator variable for currency agreement membership, ICA
ijt , plays the
role of the Zollverein indicator IZV
ijt in equation (3).33
33Both of our currency agreement instrumental variables are related to the factors that raise the gains from a
currency union stressed by Alesina and Barro (2002). First, the reason why the gains from currency agreements
for the Southern German states (of the Gulden1754 bloc) were relatively high had to do with these states
￿nancing the wars following the French Revolution in ways that were more detrimental to the value of their
25We employ only a subset of the data in the empirical analysis, namely observations at ￿ve-
year intervals (1800, 1805, ..., 1895). Since in the case of wheat, shocks to prices often a⁄ect the
crop for several years, using annual information would yield relatively little additional informa-
tion while at the same time creating serial correlation.34 Table 2 presents summary statistics of
the data. The average price gap in our sample is 0.15, with a standard deviation of 0.12. The
table also shows that the fraction of observations where customs was liberalized is somewhat
higher than the fraction where a train connection existed (30% versus 21%, respectively). This
re￿ ects the fact that the customs liberalizations started in the late 1820s, which is at least a
decade before the building of railway tracks gained momentum in Germany. About 13% of the
sample had the Gulden currency in the year 1754, and the smaller distance to the coast of the
two locations in a market-pair is on average 181 kilometers. The ￿nal row of Table 2 shows
that the average number of observations per market-pair is 11.4, or an equivalent period of 57
years during the 19th century. We now turn to estimating the e⁄ect of customs liberalizations,
train connections, and currency agreements on bilateral price gaps.
currencies than the Middle and Northern German states (see Rittmann 1975, 467-469; Holtfrerich 1993, 521).
Thus, the commitment value of currency agreements for the Southern states was relatively high. And the
CurrPop variable re￿ ects in part the idea that the propensity to join an existing currency agreement rises, the
larger is the size of the economy governed by the currency agreement.
34For the most part, we also restrict our attention to observations that lie in a window of twenty-￿ve years
before or after the institutional and technological changes that we consider; this gives 6,990 observations. Results
from employing all available observations are presented in the Appendix, Table A1.
264.1 Market Expansion and the Relative Costs versus Bene￿ts of
Change
In Table 3, speci￿cation (1) presents results for the following two-stage least squares (TSLS)
regression
pdifijt = ￿s(i)s0(j) + ￿t + ￿1CUijt + "ijt
CUijt = ￿s(i)s0(j) + ￿t + ￿1DistCoastij + ￿2ZollPopijt + vijt
;
where ￿s(i)s0(j) are state-pair ￿xed e⁄ects, and ￿t are time ￿xed e⁄ects.35 Our sample includes
68 markets in 20 states and countries. Each of the more than two thousand market pairs
ij belongs to a particular state-pair, with the corresponding bilateral ￿xed e⁄ect denoted by
￿s(i)s0(j).36 These ￿xed e⁄ects control for unobserved heterogeneity at the state-pair level: for
example the geographic distance between states which typically will a⁄ect transport costs, and
the location of rivers, which may a⁄ect the importance of steam trains in bringing price gaps
down.37
The ￿rst three speci￿cations in Table 3 are included to assess the performance of the in-
strumental variables; the ￿rst-stage results are shown in Panel B, while the second-stage results
are presented in Panel A. In column (1), the positive coe¢ cient on the distance to the coast
35Reported are robust 2-step e¢ cient GMM standard errors, which are clustered at the state-pair level. This
is preferred since customs liberalizations typically occur at the state-pair level, so that trade barriers between
any markets for a given state-pair often fall away in the same year. The analogous is often the case for currency
agreements as well. Also train connections were frequently established so that the opening of a particular train
connection also connected other markets for the same pair of states.
36With 20 states and countries, there are up to 400 state-pair ￿xed e⁄ects. In the regressions, we estimate
close to 300 of those (not reported); the remaining ones cannot be estimated since such state-pairs are not
observed in the sample.
37For some of the larger states, such as Prussia, state pair ￿xed e⁄ects imperfectly control for bilateral distance
between markets. We address this by showing that the results are similar using market-pair instead of state-pair
￿xed e⁄ects. The regressions are also weighted by the number of bilateral price gap observations for a particular
pair; unweighted regressions yield quite similar results. See Table A2 in the appendix.
27indicates that markets in states that are relatively far away from the seaboard joined the Zol-
lverein relatively early. This was expected, given the strong positive cross-sectional relationship
mentioned earlier, but the ￿rst-stage regression produces this result controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity. We also ￿nd that Zollverein membership became more attractive as the Zol-
lverein population grew (coe¢ cient of 0:022 on ZollPop). In the train regression of column (2),
the market potential and the population in the year 1800 enter positively. This is consistent
with the idea that both raise the likelihood that a train connection between markets exists,
though only the market potential variable is signi￿cant at standard levels. In the currency
agreement speci￿cation (3), being in the Gulden area early on (Gulden1754) is a good predic-
tor of whether currency agreements exist, and moreover, the larger is the population covered
by currency agreements, the more likely it is that additional states join the agreement.
To sum up, the instrumental variables have the expected impact. What about the power
of the instruments? Given the poor performance of instrumental variable estimation with weak
instruments (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995, Staiger and Stock 1997), we use two statistics to
gauge the power of the instruments. Table 3 reports the p-values of the F-test of the excluded
instruments, as well as Shea￿ s partial R2 for the excluded instruments. The R2 values are
relatively low, ranging from about one to three percent. Moreover, the p-value for the F-test
of the train ￿rst-stage is one percent, which also suggests that power is limited.38 However, it
is plausible that there is variation in these IV e⁄ects. France, for example, was never o⁄ered
Zollverein membership, and thus it is not clear that the Zollverein population has the same
impact on the propensity of France to join as it does for German states. Thus, we allow the
instrumental variables￿in￿ uence to vary by state. The equations for the customs e⁄ect then
38This F-statistic is 5.25, below the rule of thumb of a minimum of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).
28become
pdifijt = ￿s(i)s0(j) + ￿t + ￿1CUijt + "ijt
CUijt = ￿s(i)s0(j) + ￿t + ￿1sDistCoastij + ￿2sZoll_Popijt + ￿ijt
; (4)
where ￿1s and ￿2s are the ￿rst-stage parameters varying by state.39 The results are shown
in columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 3.40 The additional instruments raise the explanatory
power of the ￿rst stage by at least a factor of three, and also the F-tests￿p-values are now all
lower than 0.001. The possibility that our inferences are strongly a⁄ected by weak instruments
appears to be remote now.
Looking at the second-stage results, one sees that customs liberalization, trains, and cur-
rency agreements all increase market size as evidenced by lower price gaps. The trains e⁄ect is
the largest, at about -0.22, followed by the customs impact at about -0.13, but also the currency
estimate is substantial, at about -0.10. These results are preliminary since the relative impact
of institutional and technological change can best be gauged by including both into the same
regression, something we will turn to below. For now, it is instructive to compare the IV results
with the corresponding OLS results, which are shown in Panel C of Table 3.
According to the OLS estimates, neither customs liberalization nor currency e⁄ects have
a signi￿cant impact on price gaps, which is in sharp contrast to the IV estimates. Moreover,
even though both the OLS and the IV estimate point to a signi￿cant price-gap reducing e⁄ect
from steam trains, the IV estimate is more than eight times as large as the OLS estimate.
It is thus not surprising that for all three variables speci￿cation tests strongly reject the null
39With S = 20 states and countries, the maximum number of instruments here is 40. The actual number of
instruments that are employed depends on the available price data; it is listed in the table.
40From now on, the ￿rst-stage estimates ^ ￿1s and ^ ￿2s are not shown to conserve space; they are available from
the authors upon request.
29hypotheses of exogeneity (second to last line in Table 3).41 This is the ￿rst main result of our
paper: accounting for the endogeneity of institutional and technological change is crucial for
the estimation results.
There are a number of key questions. First, why are our OLS estimates relatively close
to zero whereas others have recently found sizable impacts in OLS regressions? One reason
might be that in our sample, there are many factors that a⁄ect institutional and technological
change, and they outweigh each other to a substantial degree.42 Second, why are our IV results
larger (in absolute value) than the OLS estimates? Take the trains impact, for example. If
endogeneity of train adoption induces selection such that those market-pairs expecting large
price gap reductions adopt trains before other market-pairs anticipating smaller reductions, the
IV estimate would be smaller (in absolute value), not larger than the OLS estimate. However,
this is not what we ￿nd. Instead, the results suggest that many of the late train-adopting
market-pairs are those that would have bene￿ted relatively strongly, and those late-adopters
tend to be relatively small cities. In that case, the relatively large e⁄ect of trains on shrinking
price gaps becomes apparent only once the IV estimation un-does the relation between timing
of adoption and market size. In addition, the IV estimation might also address measurement
error issues that could bias the OLS estimate towards zero. Speci￿cally, the 0/1 trains variable
41These Hausman-style tests are based on the di⁄erence between IV and OLS estimates. Since only IV is
consistent in the presence of endogeneity, a large di⁄erence between IV and OLS results supports endogeneity.
The large di⁄erence between OLS and IV results also gives another perspective on the possibility of weak
instruments. Weak instruments would bias the IV results towards the OLS estimates (Bound, Jaeger, and
Baker 1995). Given the substantial di⁄erences between OLS and IV estimates in (4) to (6), that appears to be
unlikely.
42We know from the historical record, for example, that personal animosity between rulers a⁄ected the
likelihood of institutional change in form of currency or trade agreements between them. Also, the leader
of some states were more interested in steam trains than others. See Henderson (1959), Hahn (1984), and
Fremdling, Federspiel, and Kunz (1995) on this. Another reason for the OLS estimates close to zero might lie
in the bilateral ￿xed e⁄ects we include, which goes beyond sets of importer and exporter ￿xed e⁄ects that are
often employed.
30is likely measuring the trains impact with error, since as noted above the trains e⁄ect would
have been dependent also on the train freight tari⁄ structure, among other factors. Similarly,
the actual Zollverein accession date of certain states was occasionally a⁄ected by the personal
preferences of the states￿leaders.43 Because the IV estimation, in contrast, predicts Zollverein
accession with the distance to the coast and Zollverein population, it is not prone to this type
of measurement error.
Another important issue is whether the instruments are exogenous to price gaps. As usual,
there can be no direct test of the exclusion restrictions. Exogeneity of the instruments is
however plausible for a number of reasons. First, on a priori grounds, DistCoast is based
on exogenous geographic factors while Gulden1754 and Pop1800 are based on pre-sample
information. And as noted above, the market potential, Zollverein population, and currency
agreement population measures by construction do not depend critically on characteristics of
the market-pair ij itself. Second, we have employed overidenti￿cation tests that ask whether
the instruments as a set appear to be valid. The p-value of Hansen￿ s J test statistic is shown in
the last row of Table 3, and in none of these tests can we reject the null of instrument validity
at standard levels of signi￿cance. Third, we have conducted some informal analysis on the
exclusion restrictions by computing the sample correlation between price gap, the dependent
variable, and the instruments. These correlations are typically quite low. For example, the
correlation of pdif with Pop1800; DistCoast; and Gulden1754 is equal to ￿0:017; 0:013; and
￿0:024; respectively. Moreover, in exploratory regressions of the price gap on the instrumental
variables, the latter are typically not signi￿cant.
43Or, for that matter, by the preferences of foreign leaders. The decision of Hanover to delay its accession to
the Prussian-led Zollverein, for example, was to a signi￿cant extent determined by the preferences of the King
of England, who ruled Hanover in personal union.
31The following section turns to estimating the impact of institutional and technological
change in direct comparison to each other.
4.2 Institutional and technological change compared
We ￿rst consider customs liberalizations and the establishment of train connections. In Table
4, column (1), the customs e⁄ect is estimated at about 7% and the trains e⁄ect at about
13%. These estimates are lower by about 40% compared to the results in Table 3, where one
variable at a time is included. This suggests that, quite plausibly, customs liberalization and
train adoption explain to some extent the same variation in changing price gaps. The ￿rst-stage
regressions are strong and the Hansen J test indicates that exogeneity of the instruments cannot
be rejected at standard signi￿cance levels. Comparing the impact from currency agreements
with the introduction of steam trains, the former lowers price gaps by about 6% while trains
have a 16% e⁄ect (column (2)).
How about the impact of trains relative to both customs liberalization and currency agree-
ments? It turns out that it is di¢ cult to estimate jointly the e⁄ect from customs liberalization
and currency agreements, since markets that bene￿ted from one typically also bene￿ted from
the other (the correlation of CU and LT is 0.75). In order to be able to compare the impact
from steam trains with a broad institutions e⁄ect, we construct a new variable, INSTijt that
incorporates both currency and customs information:
INSTijt =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if CUijt = 0 and LTijt = 0
1 if CUijt = 1 and LTijt = 0 or CUijt = 0 and LTijt = 1
2 if CUijt = 1 and LTijt = 1
(5)
32Speci￿cation (3) in Table 4 gives an impact for this institutions variable of about 3%, while the
trains e⁄ect is estimated at about 13%. The estimate of 3% for INST might appear somewhat
low in the light of 7% for customs and 6% for currency agreements. At the same time, given
that CU and LT are correlated, one would expect that CU in column (1) and LT in column
(2) pick up part of the e⁄ect from the other institutional variable, and, if one compares the
CU and LT estimates for the impact for INST = 2 (both CU and LT), they are similar,
namely 6%. Moreover, also diminishing returns to institutional change might explain part of
the ￿nding. To sum up, with train estimates of around 14% and customs or currency impacts
of about 6.5%, the impact of technological change on market size in the 19th century was about
twice as large as that of institutional change. This is our second major ￿nding.
We now turn to a number of important robustness checks, see Table 5. While the baseline
results from Table 4 are repeated on the left in columns (3) and (4), the sample is restricted
to the years from 1820 to 1880. It is during these 60 years that most of the train connections
were established, and when customs borders were liberalized, and currency agreements were
formed. Moreover, this period also excludes the early 1800s, where prices and trade may be
particularly strongly a⁄ected by wars (the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815). Next, we show
results from trimmed price gap samples. Speci￿cally, there we drop the observations that
exhibit the 2.5% highest and 2.5% lowest price di⁄erences during the sample period. This
enables us to see whether our results are strongly driven by a small number of unusual but
in￿ uential observations. We see that for the years 1820-80, the impact of institutions is slightly
larger than in the baseline, and for the trimmed price gap sample, it is somewhat smaller, but
overall these results are not very di⁄erent.
We also examine the robustness of the results in terms of focusing on the customs lib-
33eralizations associated with Zollverein accession treaties, because there were other customs
liberalizations, and these might a⁄ect our results through direct or third-country e⁄ects. First,
there were customs liberalizations among German states outside of the Zollverein liberaliza-
tions. Second, the Zollverein as a whole liberalized trade for some years with non-Zollverein
countries. And third, countries outside of the Zollverein at times liberalized trade between each
other.44 While our analysis incorporates these to some extent, we are far from having complete
information on grain protection and liberalization for this 19th century sample.45 However,
the single biggest event in this respect occurred in the third quarter of the 19th century, when
many countries liberalized their trade. We know that the Zollverein had no external duties on
wheat for some time after the year 1853 (Tracy 1989, 87; Henderson 1959, 226). Only with the
arrival of grain from the United States about two decades later, pressure for import protection
mounted and in 1879, the German Reichstag reverted to import tari⁄s for wheat (Tracy 1989,
89).
In Table 5, we compare the results between our baseline and two alternative treatments of
customs liberalizations. For the "Pervasive Liberalization" speci￿cation (7), we assume that
the other European countries￿policies were identical to that of the Zollverein, respectively the
German Reich; we assume that during the years 1853 to 1879, no customs duties existed between
any two markets in the sample. For the "Only ZV Liberalization" speci￿cation (8), we make the
alternative assumption that there were no external customs duties for the Zollverein markets,
44An example of the ￿rst is the South German Customs Union between Bavaria and Wurttemberg. It was
formed in the year 1828 and lasted until 1833, when both states became part of the Zollverein. Our analysis
incorporates the direct but no third-country e⁄ects. An example of Zollverein customs liberalizations with other
countries is the agreement with Belgium in the year 1838. However, these were neither as comprehensive nor
as long-lasting as the Zollverein liberalizations. An example of the third point are the customs liberalizations
throughout Europe, as discussed in the following.
45For general information on 19th century trade agreements, see Pahre (2008).
34and that tari⁄s greater than zero remained in place between the non-Zollverein markets.46 The
results for speci￿cations (7) and (8) indicate that either treatment leads to similar conclusions
as our baseline. This suggests that accounting fully for temporary liberalizations and controlling
for third-country e⁄ects will not change our main ￿ndings.
We have also extended this robustness analysis in other dimensions.47 This can be found in
Tables A1 to A4 in the Appendix. Overall, these results con￿rm the above ￿ndings.
4.3 The direct and indirect e⁄ect of institutions
In this section we expand the analysis to consider indirect e⁄ects of institutions through their
impact on the introduction of steam trains. Figure 4 illustrates the idea: in addition to the
direct e⁄ect of institutions on market size￿ the solid arrows from currency agreements and
customs liberalizations￿ we now extend our analysis to indirect e⁄ects from institutions on the
adoption of steam trains on market size (the dashed arrows). We consider the interaction of two
institutions on the adoption of steam trains, one more proximate and one more fundamental.
The former is whether the steam trains for a particular market were primarily run by the state
or by private agents. There is a general tendency in the literature to assume that private
railways would be more e¢ cient (e.g., Fremdling 1975), although as noted above this need not
be so if the state provides an important public good. In 19th century Central Europe, both
state railways and private railways were signi￿cant in size, which enables us to compare the
impact of the two on market size.
46Even though many European countries had relatively low duties on grain in the period of 1850-80, and in
particular between 1866-79, they were typically not equal to zero; see Bairoch (1989) and Jacks (2005).
47This includes shorter and longer time horizons (instead of a 25 year window), limited-information maximum
likelihood estimation (instead of TSLS), additional controls for unobserved heterogeneity (market-pair ￿xed
e⁄ects instead of state-pair ￿xed e⁄ects), unweighted regressions, and robustness analysis by country.
35We also use a more fundamental institutional variable, which is the date at which serfdom
was formally abolished in a state or country. We take the abolition of serfdom as a general
sign that highly discretionary and exploitative activities by the state towards private agents are
becoming less likely.48 To the extent that this general institutional setting a⁄ects the impact
of steam trains on market size, we expect that states that abolish serfdom relatively early will
tend to see stronger gains from train adoption than late-abolishing states. It is important to
note that in this analysis we treat the existence of a particular form of railway ownership and
serfdom as exogenously given.49
The results are shown in Table 6. In speci￿cations (1) and (2), we add two variables
to the baseline results: ￿rst, there is Train_StateRailway, which is the interaction of the
0/1 trains variable with StateRailways, an indicator of the importance of state railways in
market pair ij. The latter is a constant for each market pair ij; taking on values between
0 (both markets are private) and 1 (both markets have state railways). This variable is also
included by itself to avoid misspeci￿cation. In the regression, we treat the interaction variable
Train_StateRailway as endogenous and StateRailways as exogenous. The results suggest
that state-run steam trains had a signi￿cantly smaller impact on market size than private-run
railways. Moreover, with around 70 percent, the e¢ ciency of state railways in reducing price
gaps is substantially lower.50
48It is not crucial for our analysis to know when serfdom in a particular state or country fell out of use (which
was typically considerably earlier than the time when it was formally abolished).
49We return to this issue in section 5. Note that from Figure 4, one might also think that the existence or
non-existence of serfdom might in￿ uence the impact of currency agreements and customs liberalization in an
economy. We have explored this possibility but found little evidence for it. Further, one might postulate that
serfdom (or state railway ownership) would explain the timing of when train connections were built. However,
since the correlation of the 0/1 trains variable with either the date of the abolition of serfdom or whether state
railways dominated is low, this is unlikely.
50A change from StateRailway = 0 to StateRailway = 1 is associated with a 85% lower trains e⁄ect in
speci￿cation (1), and with a 55% lower impact according to speci￿cation (2).
36In columns (3) and (4), we include another interaction variable Train_LateAbolition. Here,
LateAbolition is a 0/1 variable taking the value of 1 if serfdom was present in at least one of
the markets i and j after the year 1831. The rationale of using the maximum year in pair ij
is that low institutional quality in one market is enough for it to be unlikely that trains will
be important in leading to trade. We ￿nd that the impact of trains on market size tends to be
lower in states that abolished serfdom relatively late, compared to states that abolished serfdom
earlier. The ￿ndings are consistent with theories in which the establishment of non-absolutist
institutions (no serfdom), or reliance on private railways, lead to greater increases in market
size than when railways are state-operated, or the state is feudal. These results are broadly
con￿rmed in a number of robustness checks (see Table A5 in the appendix).
At the same time, one needs to be cautious in interpreting these results. First, the size of
the reduction in the trains e⁄ect from late-serfdom-abolishers is smaller than that from state
railways (20 versus 70 percent). Second, the coe¢ cient on the linear LateAbolition variable
in (3), as well as on StateRailway in (1) and (2), is negative. Relatively low price gaps
among late-abolishing market-pairs (or with state-run railways) is not what one expects if
early abolishment of serfdom is a general sign of economic e¢ ciency-oriented institutions. In
addition, the simple correlation between StateRailway and LateAbolition is negative, that is,
state railways dominated where serfdom was abolished relatively early. It appears, therefore,
that while there is evidence that the technology e⁄ect of railways indeed is in￿ uenced by the
speci￿c institutional setting, more work is needed to determine the precise relationship between
proximate and fundamental indicators of institutional quality on the one, and their relationship
with technological change on the other hand.
The following section presents some concluding discussion.
375 Conclusions
Do institutional and technological change a⁄ect the size of the market? To answer this question,
we examined systematic deviations from the Law of One Price in Western and Central Europe
over the 19th century. This setting is particularly interesting since at that time national and
international markets were ￿rst emerging. To examine systematic deviations from the Law
of One Price, we focus on the market price of wheat in cities in large parts of Europe. The
analysis embodies three determinants of trade and the size of the market: customs liberaliza-
tions, currency agreements, and train transportation. Admittedly, this list may be incomplete.
However, the analysis covers the Zollverein liberalizations, monetary uni￿cation in Germany,
and transportation improvements in form of steam trains, which are a priori all of ￿rst-order
importance for European economic development during this time. Our empirical results strik-
ingly demonstrate that both institutional and technology change must ￿gure prominently for
any understanding of the expansion of markets and economic development.
It would have been impossible to arrive at these results without extensive data. To this
end, we constructed a unique database on wheat prices, geographic, city, state, and country
characteristics, customs and currency agreements, and train connections for 68 markets in a
major part of Europe over the entire 19th century. This detailed data lets us address the
reality that institutional as well as technological change are endogenous responses to economic
conditions at the time. We ￿nd that accounting for this endogeneity gives vastly di⁄erent
results than not doing so.
Quantitatively, while there is some variation our estimates are for the most part highly
consistent. We ￿nd that the introduction of steam trains reduced price gaps by about fourteen
38percentage points; customs liberalizations lowered price gaps by about seven percentage points
and currency agreements by about six percentage points. Since there appears to be diminishing
returns, the combined impact of currency agreements and customs liberalization for the typical
market would still be substantially below what the introduction of steam trains would do. Thus,
we ￿nd that technological change had a larger e⁄ect on market size than institutional change
in 19th century Europe. With a decline in price gaps of about twenty-two percentage points in
the sample, the introduction of trains together with currency and customs agreements account
for most of the overall decline in price gaps over this period.
We have also asked whether there exist additional indirect e⁄ects from a state￿ s institutions.
In particular, we were interested to see whether a state￿ s institutions in￿ uence the rate of
technological change, in this case the adoption of steam trains. There are a number of possible
channels of why this might be so, and correspondingly, the paper examines whether either
proximate or more fundamental institutions have played a role. Both the former, measured
by the ownership of railways, as well as the latter, captured by whether serfdom existed, are
found to have in￿ uenced the e¢ ciency of steam trains in raising the size of the market. In
particular, for markets that were served primarily by state railways, or that were located in
states that abolished serfdom relatively late, the introduction of steam trains reduced price
gaps by subtantially less than when railways were privately run or when serfdom had been
abolished early. Thus our analysis identi￿es an important indirect e⁄ect from institutions on
economic performance.
This research suggests a number interesting areas of future research. One is the relationship
between institutions and technological change. Recently, economists have been quite successful
in explaining which countries are rich and which are poor with variation in institutional quality.
39There is also plenty of evidence that institutional quality a⁄ects the rate of technical change.51
At the same time, we still know too little about what exactly determines whether an economy￿ s
institutions will foster technological change, and how fundamental institutions are linked to
more proximate ones in their e⁄ect on economic e¢ ciency and growth. The analysis in this
paper is only a ￿rst step in this direction.
Our results also indicate that studies of the impact of technological change today might
have a very high return. One example is the impact of advances in information and communi-
cations technologies￿ the transactions costs of technological knowledge￿ on o⁄shoring and the
associated relocation of both jobs and production, as well as the resulting changes in global
trade ￿ ows. The analysis in this paper suggests more generally that with a good measure
of technological change, it is not only feasible to estimate the impact of technology on eco-
nomic outcomes, but such studies may also yield dramatic new insights on the economics of
development.
51Recent work includes Acharya and Keller (2008) and Coe, Helpman, and Ho⁄maister (2008).
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48Table 1: Summary Statistics
Overall sample period: 1800 - 1899
Year of 
Number Year of Year of Year of Earliest
of price Mean Earliest Zollverein Earliest Legal
No City State/Country obs. price Obs. Accession Rail Connection Tender Status
1 Prague Austria-Hungary 8 19.47 1836 1845
2 Salzburg Austria-Hungary 4 29.02 1849 1860
3 Venice Austria-Hungary 7 15.57 1836 1856
4 Vienna Austria-Hungary 86 20.57 1820 1845
5 Baden Baden 28 16.29 1818 1836 1846 1837
6 Augsburg Bavaria 41 16.92 1815 1834 1840 1837
7 Bamberg Bavaria 41 16.32 1815 1834 1844 1837
8 Bayreuth Bavaria 41 16.82 1815 1834 1853 1837
9 Erding Bavaria 41 16.33 1815 1834 1859 1837
10 Kempten Bavaria 41 18.81 1815 1834 1852 1837
11 Landshut Bavaria 41 15.58 1815 1834 1854 1837
12 Lindau Bavaria 41 19.14 1815 1834 1852 1837
13 Memmingen Bavaria 41 18.00 1815 1834 1858 1837
14 Munich Bavaria 100 18.69 1800 1834 1840 1837
15 Noerdlingen Bavaria 41 16.14 1815 1834 1849 1837
16 Nurnberg Bavaria 45 16.42 1811 1834 1844 1837
17 Regensburg Bavaria 41 15.09 1815 1834 1859 1837
18 Straubing Bavaria 41 14.65 1815 1834 1858 1837
19 Wuerzburg Bavaria 41 16.41 1815 1834 1854 1837
20 Zweibruecken Bavaria 38 16.57 1818 1834 1857 1837
21 Brugge Belgium 100 20.62 1800 1838
22 Brussels Belgium 91 22.45 1800 1838
23 Braunschweig Brunswick 50 16.50 1800 1841 1844 1857
24 Bar-le-Duc France 30 18.08 1825 1851
25 Chalons sur Marne France 30 18.55 1825 1851
26 Luneville France 30 19.03 1825 1851
27 Mulhouse France 76 22.41 1800 1841
28 Strassburg France 76 21.63 1800 1841
29 Toulouse France 100 21.40 1800 1859
30 Bremen Free City 11 20.53 1837 1888 1847 1871
31 Frankfurt/Main Free City 14 22.57 1816 1836 1840 1837
32 Hamburg Free City 100 19.68 1800 1888 1846 1871
33 Luebeck Free City 9 17.58 1837 1867 1851 1871Table 1, cont'd
Year of 
Number Year of Year of Year of Earliest
of price Mean Earliest Zollverein Earliest Legal
No City State/Country obs. price Obs. Accession Rail Connection Tender Status
34 Goettingen Hannover 68 17.12 1800 1854 1854 1857
35 Hannover Hannover 50 17.81 1801 1854 1844 1857
36 Kassel Hesse-Cassel 27 14.22 1822 1831 1849 1857
37 Bingen Hesse-Darmstadt 1 20.34 1840 1828 1858 1837
38 Giessen Hesse-Darmstadt 1 19.12 1840 1828 1850 1837
39 Mainz Hesse-Darmstadt 3 23.68 1840 1828 1853 1837
40 Worms Hesse-Darmstadt 1 20.68 1840 1828 1853 1837
41 Wiesbaden Hesse-Nassau 1 18.13 1840 1836 1840 1837
42 Grabow Mecklenburg 71 18.45 1800 1867 1846 1871
43 Boizenburg Mecklenburg 71 18.30 1800 1867 1846 1871
44 Parchim Mecklenburg 71 17.43 1800 1867 1880 1871
45 Rostock Mecklenburg 71 17.57 1800 1867 1850 1871
46 Schwerin Mecklenburg 71 17.67 1800 1867 1847 1871
47 Wismar Mecklenburg 57 16.65 1800 1867 1848 1871
48 Nijmegen Netherlands 93 21.46 1800 1856
49 Utrecht Netherlands 15 30.66 1800 1856
50 Aachen Prussia 61 18.88 1800 1834 1841 1857
51 Berlin Prussia 61 18.14 1800 1834 1841 1857
52 Cologne Prussia 100 18.25 1800 1834 1841 1857
53 Hamm Prussia 20 20.86 1800 1834 1847 1857
54 Herdecke Prussia 20 23.23 1800 1834 1848 1857
55 Minden Prussia 13 21.49 1800 1834 1847 1857
56 Muenster Prussia 64 18.91 1800 1834 1848 1857
57 Saarlouis Prussia 20 17.70 1800 1834 1858 1857
58 Soest Prussia 20 17.71 1800 1834 1850 1857
59 Wetzlar Prussia 20 19.27 1800 1834 1862 1857
60 Xanten Prussia 20 18.48 1800 1834 1880 1857
61 Dresden Saxony 21 16.78 1832 1834 1839 1857
62 Leipzig Saxony 68 20.15 1832 1834 1839 1857
63 Zwickau Saxony 21 18.44 1832 1834 1845 1857
64 Basel Switzerland 10 24.75 1845 1844
65 Lucerne Switzerland 9 23.94 1845 1856
66 Rorschach Switzerland 14 20.79 1824 1856
67 Stuttgart Wurttemberg 5 23.68 1850 1834 1850 1837
68 Ulm Wurttemberg 6 22.81 1850 1834 1850 1837
Prices in Bavarian Gulden, per Bavarian Scheffel (about 223 liter)Table 2: Sample Summary Statistics
Std.
Variable Mean Dev. Variable Description
Price Gap 0.15 0.12 Absolute value of the log difference of wheat price in market i and market j (pdif)
Train Connection 0.21 0.41 0/1 variable; 1 if train connection exists between markets i and j in year t, 0 otherwise (TR)
Currency Agreement 0.23 0.42 0/1 variable; 1 if currencies of i and j are legal tender in both markets in year t, 0 otherwise (LT)
Customs Liberalization 0.30 0.46 0/1 variable; 1 if customs are liberalized between markets i and j in year t, 0 otherwise (CU)
City Population in 1800 0.39 0.40 Average of the population of city i and city j in the year 1800; in 100,000 people
Market Potential 13.93 1.47 Log distance-weighted state population in year t
Gulden in 1754 0.13 0.34 0/1 variable, equal to 1 if both markets i and j had Gulden as its currency in the year 1754
Currency Population 7.97 8.19 Log distance-weighted population of states that gave each other legal tender status in year t
Distance to the Coast 1.81 1.67 Minimum of market i and market j's distance to the nearest coast, in 100 kilometers
Zollverein Population 10.29 4.26 Log distance-weighted population of states that belonged to the Zollverein in year t
State Railways 0.68 0.33 Average of share of railway in markets in and j that is run by the government 
Late Abolition of Serfdom 0.24 0.43 0/1 variable indicating that one or both markets i and j abolished slavery after the year 1831
Length of Observation 11.40 4.71 Number of observations per market-pair
Summary statistics for the baseline sample of twenty-five years before and after train connection, currency agreement, or customs liberalization
Statistics weighted by number of observations of market-pair; Number of observations: 6,990Table 3: Market Expansion and the Relative Costs versus Benefits of Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)























City Population in 1800 0.064
(0.050)
Currency Agreement Population 0.020
#
(0.008)
Gulden in 1754 0.998
#
(0.004)
F-statistic p-value < 0.001 0.01 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Shea Partial R-squared (percent) 1.7 1.1 2.9 11.4 3.6 9.1
Number of excluded instruments 2 2 2 36 24 39








Endogeneity test p-value < 0.01 0.03 < 0.01
Hansen OverID test p-value 0.13 0.37 0.26
Dependent variable: absolute value of percentage bilateral price difference; robust standard errors clustered at the state-pair level
in parentheses. All regressions include year- and state-pair fixed effects. #/*/+ Estimate is significant at the 1%/5%/10% level
Sample observations are within a twenty-five year span before and after the establishment of train connection, 
customs liberalization, or currency agreement; number of observations: 6,990; p-value of F-statistics of all regressions < 0.001Table 4: Institutional and Technological Change Compared
(1) (2) (3)















Panel B: First-Stage Statistics
Trains First-Stage
   F-statistic p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
   Shea Partial R-squared (percent) 5.6 4.8 6.1
Insitutions First-Stage
   F-statistic p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
   Shea Partial R-squared (percent) 18.9 9.8 19.4
Number of excluded instruments 74 62 96
Hansen OverID test p-value 0.14 0.28 0.16
Number of observations 6,990 6,990 6,990
Dependent variable: absolute value of percentage bilateral price difference; robust standard errors clustered at the state-pair level
in parentheses. All regressions include year- and state-pair fixed effects. #/*/+ Estimate is significant at the 1%/5%/10% level
Sample observations are within a twenty-five year span before and after the establishment of a train connection, 
customs liberalization, or currency agreement; p-value of F-statistics of all regressions < 0.001
Instruments: Population in 1800, market potential (specification (1)-(3)), distance to the coast, Zollverein population
(specificaitions (1) and (3)), and Gulden in 1754, currency agreement population (in (2) and (3)), all varying by stateTable 5: Robustness Analysis
Pervasive Lib'n Only ZV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)























Panel B: First-Stage Summary
Shea R-squared (%)
   Trains 5.6 4.8 5.3 4.8 5.6 4.9 5.6 5.6
   Institutions 18.9 9.8 17.7 7.9 18.9 10.2 15.5 12.6
Number of excluded instruments 74 62 74 62 74 62 74 74
Hansen OverID test p-value 0.14 0.28 0.21 0.32 0.18 0.28 0.13 0.15
Number of observations 6,990 6,990 6,072 6,072 6,642 6,642 6,990 6,990
Dependent variable: absolute value of percentage bilateral price difference; robust standard errors clustered at the state-pair level
in parentheses.  #/*/+ Estimate is significant at the 1%/5%/10% level; all regressions include year fixed effects and state-pair fixed effects
Sample observations are within a twenty-five year span before and after the establishment of a train connection, 
 a customs liberalization, or a currency agreement; instruments as in Table 4; p-value of F-statistics of all regressions < 0.001
Baseline Years 1820 to 1880 Trimmed 95% sample Non-ZV customs liberalizationsTable 6: The Direct and Indirect Impact of Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Panel B: First-Stage Summary
Shea R-squared (%)
   Trains 4.3 4.7 5.9 5.2
   Trains * State Railways 2.4 3.5
   Trains * Late Abolition of Serfdom 11.3 16.4
   Customs lib'n or currency agr't 6.0 5.3 18.8 10.7
Number of excluded instruments 37 26 74 63
Hansen OverID test p-value 0.11 0.28 0.16 0.15
Dependent variable: absolute value of percentage bilateral price difference; robust standard errors clustered at the state-pair level
in parentheses. All regressions include year- and state-pair fixed effects. P-value of F-test of all regressions < 0.001
#/*/+ Estimate is significant at the 1%/5%/10% level. Number of observations: 6,990. Sample of observations within
 a 25 year window before and after the establishment of  train connection, customs liberalization, or currency agreement
Instruments: Population in 1800, market potential (specification (1)-(4)), distance to the coast, Zollverein population
(specificaitions (1) and (3)), and Gulden in 1754, currency agreement population (in (2) and (4))
P-value of F-test of excluded instruments <0.001 in all cases
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11 Robustness analysis
This section presents results that shed additional light on the robustness of our ￿ndings.
We ￿rst turn to the time horizon that is considered in our main speci￿cation. Recall that
the impact of institutional and technological change on price gaps is estimated from a win-
dow of twenty-￿ve years before and after the ￿ change￿(i.e., customs liberalization, currency
agreements, or train connection). We report results from varying the size of this window. In
general, a larger window will have two consequences. First, it amounts to employing data
over a longer time horizon. If there are important adjustment costs that limit the market
size in the short-term, then one expects to estimate a larger impact on price gaps with a rel-
atively large window. At the same time, a larger window makes identi￿cation more di¢ cult,
since in the long-run many other processes may be important. This reduces the signal-to-
noise ratio and will typically lead to lower estimates. Which of these e⁄ects dominates is
not immediately clear.
In Table A1, we see that the customs and currency estimates are similar to the baseline
results for the shorter window of ￿fteen years, and this is the case also for the train estimate.
For a longer time horizon of thirty-￿ve years, the estimates for institutional change move to-
wards zero, especially for currency agreements. Using all available data, neither the customs
nor the currency e⁄ect is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. In contrast, the trains estimate
rises, from about -0.14 to -0.21. This however might re￿ ect not only the long-run trains e⁄ect
but also the weakening of the institution variables (the correlation of TR with CU is about
6%, and the correlation of TR with LT is about 7%). Overall, the results are consistent
with the relatively large impact we estimate for trains, and moreover, the twenty-￿ve year
window in our baseline appears to be a good compromise between identifying power and
time horizon of the estimate.
Next, we present results for market-pair instead of state-pair ￿xed e⁄ects in Table A2.
Recall that the analysis is at the level of the market-pair, so using deterministic market-pair
￿xed amounts to the usual within estimator panel speci￿cation. This has the advantage
that time-invariant heterogeneity (including bilateral distance) at the market-pair level is
controlled for. It may, however, exacerbate measurement error problems. As seen from Table
A2, the impact of the institution variables is somewhat lower, around -0.045 instead of -0.065,
while the average trains e⁄ect is -0.14, as before, but it varies more across speci￿cations
(compare (4) and (1)). Overall, our main ￿ndings hold up both qualitative as well as
quantitatively.
Table A2 also shows results for the estimation with limited-information maximum like-
lihood (LIML), which have in some settings, in particular when the instruments are weak,
better properties than two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimators. In this case, both the
currency and the customs point estimates are similar to those with TSLS, although the
LIML estimates are less precise (and for currency agreements not signi￿cant at standard
levels). The LIML trains estimates are somewhat larger than the TSLS estimates, although
the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant. We also show in speci￿cations (3) and (6) of
Table A2 that unweighted regressions yield very similar results to the baseline reported in
Table 4 (recall that in the baseline we perform weighted regressions, where the number of
2bilateral observations for a given market-pair serves as the weight).
We take another step by examining the sensitivity of our results with respect to features
speci￿c to particular countries. For example, Austria-Hungary around the year 1820 still
had internal customs duties (Bairoch 1989, 6). This would be in contrast to our assumption
that there are no customs borders between any two markets of a given state or country with
contiguous areas ( CUijt = 1, all t). The following analysis is also useful to examine whether
our analysis holds even if we restrict the analysis to subsets of states. The six speci￿cations
in Table A3 show trains and currency results for restricted samples; "No Austria-H", for
example, means that all observations involving a market in Austria-Hungary are dropped
from the sample. On the right, we report the average of the six restricted-sample estimates,
as well as the baseline estimate from Table 4.
It is clear that individual country- observations have a substantial e⁄ect on the currency
estimate; the average is only about half the size of the baseline estimate. At the same time, it
is reassuring that currency agreements in the ￿fteen German states, labeled "Only Germany"
in Table A3, have a similar e⁄ect as in the sample as a whole. This allays concerns that
our results are primarily identifying the di⁄erence between German and non-German states.
Turning to the analysis of the customs and trains e⁄ects in Table A4, we ￿nd these results
to be very robust. Also in the case of customs we estimate a signi￿cant price-gap reducing
impact from liberalizations if the sample is limited to the German states. Moreover, the
"Only Germany" customs impact is somewhat smaller than in the full sample, while the
"Only Germany" currency point estimate is slightly larger than in the full sample, so there
is no clear pattern of how sample composition a⁄ects the results.
Finally, we have also further examined the ￿ndings on indirect e⁄ects of institutions
presented in Table 6. These robustness checks are presented in Table A5. We see that
market pairs that were served by state railways see a considerably smaller reduction of price
gaps with the arrival of steam trains, and in three out of four cases this e⁄ect is statistically
signi￿cant at standard levels. Also the results for the more fundamental institutional quality
variable, late abolition of serfdom, are seen to be robust: steam trains brought price gaps
down by less, on average, if they operated in states that abolished serfdom relatively late
(Table A5, on the right). The robustness checks also con￿rm our ￿ndings above that the
quantitative e⁄ect of the proximate variable, StateRailways, appears to be larger than that
of the fundamental variable, LateAbolition.
To sum up, we ￿nd the estimates to be robust, more so for the trains and customs
estimates than that for currency agreements. Given the generally smaller number of observed
changes for currency agreements relative to customs liberalizations or train adoptions, it is
di¢ cult to know for sure whether the impact is smaller or less-precisely estimated. In general,
however, the robustness analysis con￿rms the main ￿ndings emphasized in the text.
2 Data Sources and Construction
Price data The two most important sources for information on wheat prices are Shiue and
Keller (2007) and Seu⁄ert (1857). The former covers markets in Bavaria, Belgium, France,
Mecklenburg, and the Netherlands, while the latter provides information on markets in
3Austria-Hungary, Baden, Brunswick, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Nassau, Saxony,
Switzerland, and Wurttemberg. The wheat prices for Prussian markets were provided by
Michael Kopsidis, see Kopsidis (2002). Additional sources that improve the coverage are
Fremdling and Hohorst (1979), Gerhard and Kaufhold (1990) for Prussia, Hanauer (1878)
for the Alsatian cities Mulhouse and Strassbourg, Shiue and Keller￿ s (2007) data for Vienna,
and Vierteljahrshefte (1935) for Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich.
Since neither quantity nor monetary units were standardized in Europe during the 19th
century, conversion rates are required for our analysis of absolute price di⁄erences, and all
prices are converted into Bavarian Gulden per Bavarian Schae⁄el. The conversion factors
are taken from the original sources, reported to some extent in Shiue and Keller (2007), as











Baden Malter 0.67 Gulden 1.00
Brunswick Himten 0.14 Thaler 1.75
Belgium Hectoliter 0.45 Francs 0.47
Frankfurt Malter 0.51 Gulden 1.00
France Hectoliter 0.45 Francs 0.47
Hamburg Fass 0.24 Mark Banco 0.88
Hanover Himten 0.14 Thaler 1.75
Hesse-Darmstadt Malter 0.57 Gulden 1.00
Hesse-Cassel Schae⁄el 0.36 Gulden 1.00
Hesse-Nassau Malter 0.49 Gulden 1.00
Netherlands Zacken 0.45 Gulden Courants 0.99
Austria-Hungary Metzen 0.27 Gulden 1.22
Prussia Schae⁄el 0.24 Thaler 1.75
Saxony Schae⁄el 0.46 Thaler 1.75
Switzerland Concordia Malter 0.67 Concordia Francs 0.47
Wurttemberg Schae⁄el 0.80 Gulden 1.00
Other data The main sources of information on railway building are the digital histori-
cal maps provided at IEG￿ s website at the University of Mainz, http://www.ieg-maps.uni-
mainz.de/ and Putzger (1997). We derive the state versus private railways indicator pre-
sented in Table A6 from information in Fremdling, Federspiel, and Kunz (1995). The customs
liberalization variable is based on information on the history of Zollverein treaties in Hen-
derson (1959) and Hahn (1984), as well as the historical maps at IEG (2008). Also the
currency agreement variable is based on information in Henderson (1959) and Hahn (1984),
as well as Willis (1896). City population data comes from Bairoch et al. (1988) and de
Vries (1984), while state and country-level population ￿gures come from Kunz (2008) and
Mitchell (1980). Information on serfdom, as shown in Table A6, comes from Blum (1978).
4Finally, the information on cities￿latitude and longitude that we employ to compute several
variables (DistCoast, ZollPop, Market_Potential; and CurrPop) comes from maporama,
http://world.maporama.com/ .
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6Table A1: The expansion of market size over different time horizons
25 year 15 year 35 year All 25 year 15 year 35 year All 
window window window Data window window window Data



















(0.022) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013)
Panel B: First-Stage Statistics
Trains First-Stage
   Shea Partial R-squared (percent) 5.6 6.6 4.2 3.3 4.8 7.4 3.9 3.5
Insitutions First-Stage
   Shea Partial R-squared (percent) 18.9 12.8 17.8 15.4 9.8 13.3 10.9 11.1
Number of excluded instruments 74 74 74 74 62 61 64 64
Hansen OverID test p-value 0.14 0.32 0.08 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.44 0.62
Number of observations 6,990 4,800 8,403 10,434 6,990 4,800 8,403 10,434
Dependent variable: absolute value of percentage bilateral price difference; robust standard errors clustered at the state-pair level
in parentheses. All regressions include year- and state-pair fixed effects. #/*/+ Estimate is significant at the 1%/5%/10% level; p-values of F-statistics of all regressions < 0.001
Sample observations are within a certain window before and after the establishment of a train connection, customs liberalization, or a currency agreement
Instruments: Population in 1800, market potential (specification (1)-(3)), distance to the coast, Zollverein population (specificaitions (2) and (3)), and Gulden in 1754,
currency agreement population (in (2) and (3)), all varying by state; p-value of F-test of excluded instruments <0.001 in all cases
Customs liberalization and steam trains Currency agreements and steam trainsTable A2: Additional controls and alternative estimators
Market-Pair FE LIML Alt. weights Market-Pair FE LIML Alt. weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


















Panel B: First-Stage Summary
Shea R-squared (%)
   Trains 3.1 5.6 4.7 2.9 3.8 4.2
   Institutions 22.9 18.9 19.1 15.4 13.9 17.6
Number of excluded instruments 38 74 74 38 60 63
Hansen OverID test p-value 0.51 0.16 0.13 0.22 0.43 0.22
Number of observations 6,593 6,990 6,990 6,593 6,990 6,990
Dependent variable: absolute value of percentage bilateral price difference; robust standard errors clustered at the state-pair level; in parentheses.  
#/*/+ Estimate is significant at the 1%/5%/10% level; all regressions include year fixed effects; p-values of F-statistics of all regressions < 0.001
Sample observations are within a twenty-five year span before and after the establishment of  a train connection, customs liberalization, or a currency agreement
Specifications (1) and (4) include market-pair fixed effects instead of state-pair fixed effects; (2) and (5) employ limited-information maximum
likelihood (LIML) instead of two-stage least squares. Specifications (3) and (6) do not weight the regressions by the number of observations for each market-pair
Customs liberalization and steam trains Currency agreements and steam trainsTable A3: Country results - currency agreements
No Austria-H No Belgium No France No Netherld. No Switzerld. Only Germany Average Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Table 4








(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.019)
Currency agreement -0.006 0.030
* -0.090
# -0.008 -0.010 -0.068
# -0.025 -0.059
(0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.003)
Panel B: First-Stage Summary
Shea R-squared (%)
   Trains 2.9 4.3 6.1 5.2 5.0 6.7
   Currency agreement 15.4 13.7 11.4 10.5 11.3 32.5
Number of excluded instruments 60 59 59 59 61 46
Hansen OverID test p-value 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.15
Number of observations 6,544 6,371 5,656 6,711 6,720 4,348
Dependent variable: absolute value of percentage bilateral price difference; robust standard errors clustered at the state-pair level in parentheses.
All regressions include year- and state-pair fixed effects. #/*/+ Estimate is significant at the 1%/5%/10% level; p-values of F-statistics for all regressions < 0.001
Sample observations are within a twenty-five year span before and after the establishment of a train connection, customs liberalization, or a currency agreement
Instruments: Population in 1800, market potential (specification (1)-(3)), distance to the coast, Zollverein population
(specificaitions (1) and (3)), and Gulden in 1754, currency agreement population (in (2) and (3)), all varying by stateTable A4: Country results - customs liberalization
No Austria-H No Belgium No France No Netherlds No Switz.ld. Only Germany Average Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Table 4
















(0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006)
Panel B: First-Stage Summary
Shea R-squared (%)
   Trains 5.8 4.7 6.7 5.8 5.6 6.8
   Customs liberalization 18.5 20.4 20.0 18.9 18.9 22.3
Number of excluded instruments 69 67 69 69 69 53
Hansen OverID test p-value 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.24
Number of observations 6,544 6,371 5,656 6,711 6,720 4,348
Dependent variable: absolute value of percentage bilateral price difference; robust standard errors clustered at the state-pair level in parentheses. 
All regressions include year- and state-pair fixed effects. #/*/+ Estimate is significant at the 1%/5%/10% level; p-value of F-statistics for all regressions < 0.001
Sample observations are within a twenty-five year span before and after the establishment of a train connection, customs liberalization, or a currency agreement
Instruments: Population in 1800, market potential (specification (1)-(3)), distance to the coast, Zollverein population
(specificaitions (1) and (3)), and Gulden in 1754, currency agreement population (in (2) and (3)), all varying by stateTable A5: Robustness checks on direct versus indirect effects of institutions










(0.076) (0.056) (0.039) (0.036) (0.010) (0.021) (0.009) (0.019)




(0.118) (0.074) (0.064) (0.059)










(0.059) (0.029) (0.010) (0.008)










(0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
Late Abolition of Serfdom -0.134
# -0.055 -0.129
# -0.001
(0.007) (0.042) (0.005) (0.023)
Shea R-squared (%)
   Trains 3.2 4.6 4.5 4.8 5.7 5.2 6 5.3
   Trains * State Railways 1.8 3.3 2.5 3.7
   Trains * Late Abolition of Serfdom 7.3 12.7 18.8 16.5
Customs lib'n or currency agr't 2.2 6.2 5.7 5.4 17.7 8.1 11.5 11
Number of excluded instruments 37 26 37 27 74 63 74 63
Hansen OverID test p-value 0.08 0.36 0.10 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.26
Number of observations 6,072 6,072 6,642 6,642 6,072 6,072 6,642 6,642
Dependent variable: absolute value of percentage bilateral price difference; robust standard errors clustered at the state-pair level in parentheses. Sample as in Table 6.
All regressions include year- and state-pair fixed effects. #/*/+ Estimate is significant at the 1%/5%/10% level; p-values of F-statistics of all regressions < 0.001
Instruments: Population in 1800, market potential (specification (1)-(3)), distance to the coast, Zollverein population
(specifications (1) and (3)), and Gulden in 1754, currency agreement population (in (2) and (3)), all varying by state
Abolition of Serfdom State RailwaysTable A6: Measures of instutional quality
Number City Name State/Country Abolition of Serfdom
* State Railway Indicator
**
1 Aachen Prussia 1807 0
2 Augsburg Bavaria 1808 1
3 Karlsruhe Baden 1783 1
4 Bamberg Bavaria 1808 1
5 Bar le Duc France 1789 1
6 Basle Switzerland 1789 0
7 Bayreuth Bavaria 1808 0
8 Berlin Prussia 1807 0
9 Bingen Hesse-Darmstadt 1820 0
10 Boizenburg Mecklenburg 1820 1
11 Braunschweig Brunswick 1832 1
12 Bremen Free City  1783 1
13 Brugge Belgium 1789 1
14 Brussels Belgium 1789 1
15 Chalons-sur-Marne France 1789 1
16 Dresden Saxony 1832 0
17 Erding Bavaria 1808 1
18 Frankfurt Free City  1783 1
19 Giessen Hesse-Darmstadt 1820 0
20 Goettingen Hannover 1831 1
21 Grabow Mecklenburg 1820 1
22 Hamburg Free City  1783 1
23 Hamm Prussia 1807 0
24 Hannover Hannover 1831 1
25 Herdecke Prussia 1807 0
26 Kassel Hesse-Cassel 1831 0
27 Kempten Bavaria 1808 1
28 Köln Prussia 1807 0
29 Landshut Bavaria 1808 0
30 Leipzig Saxony 1832 0
31 Lindau Bavaria 1808 1
32 Lucerne Switzerland 1789 0
33 Luebeck Free City  1783 0
34 Luneville France 1789 1
35 Mainz Hesse-Darmstadt 1820 0
36 Memmingen Bavaria 1808 1
37 Minden Prussia 1807 0
38 Mulhouse France 1789 1
39 Munich Bavaria 1808 1
40 Münster Prussia 1807 1
41 Nijmegen Netherlands 1789 0
42 Noerdlingen Bavaria 1808 1
43 Nurnberg Bavaria 1808 1
44 Parchim Mecklenburg 1820 1
45 Prague Austria-Hungary 1848 0
46 Regensburg Bavaria 1808 0
47 Rorschach Switzerland 1789 0
48 Rostock Mecklenburg 1820 1
49 Saarlouis Prussia 1807 1
50 Salzburg Austria-Hungary 1848 0
51 Schwerin Mecklenburg 1820 1
52 Soest Prussia 1807 1
53 Strassbourg France 1789 1
54 Straubing Bavaria 1808 0
55 Stuttgart Wuerttemberg 1817 1
56 Toulouse France 1789 1
57 Ulm Wuerttemberg 1817 1
58 Utrecht Netherlands 1789 0
59 Venice Austria-Hungary 1848 0
60 Vienna Austria-Hungary 1848 0
61 Wetzlar Prussia 1807 0
62 Wiesbaden Hesse-Nassau 1812 0
63 Wismar Mecklenburg 1820 1
64 Worms Hesse-Darmstadt 1820 0
65 Wuerzburg Bavaria 1808 1
66 Xanten Prussia 1807 0
67 Zweibruecken Bavaria 1808 0
68 Zwickau Saxony 1832 0
* Year of initial decree of emancipation; source: Blum (1978) and own estimates for missing data: For Belgium (founded in 1830) and the Netherlands,
   the French date is employed; for the Free Cities, which were urban and relatively democratic, we pick the earliest year in the sample.
** State had a major role in financing and operating the key railway serving this market early on; coding for the German markets based on the descriptions of 
  the rail lines in Fremdling, Federspiel, and Kunz (1995), pp. 20-55. The markets outside Germany are coded based on O'Brien (1983) and sources therein
  We focus on the early period to make our distinction since most railways were nationalized in the late 19th centuryFigure A1: Cities in states further away from the seaboard join 
the Zollverein earlier
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nFigure A2: Larger Cities Have Railways Earlier
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